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SECRET

American Embassy
Paris, France
March 30, 1954

Dear Livie:

I note that Mr. Bidault's letter to the Secretary of some two weeks ago, which was just received here, suggests that harm would ensue from public comment on "a calendar of American origin unofficially proposed for our work and of those existence several people were aware".

From this and remarks he dropped to Ambassador Dillon, I derive a slight suspicion that Bidault, but more probably Laniel, may be preparing to use this and other allegations of "American pressure" as one of the French Government's excuses for failing to live up to the expectation, expressed in the same letter, that Laniel and he would bring about a debate on EDC ratification before Easter. I also wonder if Bidault's references to pressure may not have something to do with the reluctance I have perhaps mistakenly sensed in recent Department messages to push Bidault and Laniel as hard as possible to set rapidly a date for the debate.

I have tried to set the record straight about this time schedule business in COLED 194. However, as the matter may be brought up again, I should like to reiterate three points:

1. The paper was shown to four people only — Maurice Schumann, Alphand, Reynaud, and Pinay -- and at their respective requests I let each of them retain a copy. It was explicitly presented not as the American view of what the French should do (on most items we hoped for earlier action) but as an example of how American assurances could be fitted in with other arrangements, of how the problems to be settled might coalesce, and of how much still needed to be done before ratification. Also, in each case I made clear that the schedule was hypothetical and had been drawn up for the internal use of this mission; in each case the recipient saw nothing improper in asking to retain it; and in each case it helped at least temporarily to stimulate activity in favor of early ratification, although Laniel's and Bidault's resistance in the end deprived us of the full effect.

2. There is sufficient evidence to make it clear that the publication of this document was part of a deliberate campaign by anti-EDC elements in the Quai d'Orsay and ~~in Laniel's entourage~~ to create

The schedule, incidentally, showed no marks of origin, was on plain paper, and was unclassified.

The Honorable
Livingston T. Merchant,
Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs,
Washington 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
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public resentment against alleged American "pressure" and thus provide a further excuse for inaction. Herriot, who first broke the story, is regularly informed on EDC matters by Foreign Office officials (his original anti-EDC speech a year ago is generally known to have been based on mis-information supplied by an officer of the Quai d'Orsay's German division who had previously been removed from Alphand's staff for insubordination. Ferro of Paris-Presse and Fontaine of Le Monde, both of whom discussed the "calendar" in print, are regular Foreign Office outlets. American journalists have told us the paper could be quite easily obtained either in the Foreign Office or from Laniel's cabinet. Most interesting of all is the attached memo from the Embassy's expert on Communist affairs to the effect that the copy of the document published in the Communist press (the only one to publish it textually) was obtained directly from Parodi!

3. Despite the best efforts of its disseminators, the document made almost no splash. Herriot's sibylline reference to it passed with very little comment, and outside the Communist press most Paris papers referred to it only once, often with the notation that it was an unofficial working document and that in any case the schedule had obviously not been followed. Even the publication of the full text by the crypto-Communist Tribune des Nations made hardly a ripple. Le Monde on March 22 wrote finis to the whole story by publishing a reasonably accurate account playing down the whole affair and stressing that the "timetable" was a strictly internal American document shown to certain French officials for their information only and which had not served in any way as a basis for action — which, alas, was true. (A copy of the Le Monde account is also enclosed.)

I have no way of knowing whether either Laniel or Bidault were aware that their subordinates were engaged in this sort of campaign. In any case Alphand was very disturbed when Tomlinson casually suggested to him that, in view of all the gossip going about, a statement should perhaps be issued making clear the nature and purpose of the document and to whom it had been given. Alphand called back later to plead that nothing be done on the subject. The next day Fontaine's article appeared calling off the campaign. As an amusing sidelight, it transpired that Alphand had made minor changes in the timetable, translated it into French, and presented it to Bidault as his own work.

Aside from such diversions, the French Government is explaining its failure to live up to its hazy commitment on holding a debate "immediately after Berlin" on the grounds that the various "pre-conditions" have not yet been fulfilled. On this point, too, I think the record should be set straight; it shows that the French

DECLASSIFIED

Government has initiated no efforts to bring about the fulfillment of these conditions and that in each case where something has in fact been done the initiative has come from outside.

Laniel has consistently mentioned three conditions: U.S. assurances, U.K. association, and the "certainty of a Saar settlement". The need to obtain a discipline vote for the Treaty from the French Socialist Party has imposed a fourth — the satisfaction of Mollet's demand for direct election of a European Common Assembly.

On the first point, the U.S. Government on its own initiative informed Bidault on March 3 that its assurances would be ready by March 12. The draft was shown to Bidault and his collaborators on March 12, and presumably by Bidault to Laniel a day or two thereafter. The French were informed that we were prepared to issue the Presidential Statement on Assurances as soon as a date for debate was publicly announced. We are still waiting.

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On the Saar, Bidault and Laniel are maintaining that their inability to reach a Saar settlement during March was due to Adenauer's trip to Greece and Turkey. It should be noted that it was Adenauer, under urging from the U. S. Government, who suggested the meeting with Bidault in early March, and specifically suggested it should take place several days before his departure in order to make possible a full discussion. The postponement of the meeting till the day of Adenauer's departure March 9 was on French request, and discussion at this meeting was not facilitated by the presentation at 5 o'clock the previous evening of a new French paper containing few if any concessions from previous French stands.

Blankenhorn has assured us that he was prepared to reach agreement on the Council of Europe solution (less Article 19 of the Peace Treaty) during his talks with François-Poncet on March 12 and 16; the text of the March 16 Blankenhorn proposal would seem to bear out this statement. Since Adenauer's departure, however, Bidault has left the negotiations

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in the hands of Maurice Schumann and the Quai d'Orsay and has permitted them to hold their initial positions even on points (like full sovereignty status for the Saar) on which he has told us privately he was prepared to cede.

Finally, the Socialist text on direct elections has been known to Bidault and Laniel for some weeks, and Mollet claims he had been trying for almost two weeks to see Bidault before he finally succeeded in obtaining an appointment. On this matter there are now some signs of light (COLED 215). However, there is no assurance that Laniel will accept the Bidault-Mollet deal, and we do not know as of today whether he has even been apprised of it. In any case, so much time has passed that there is no chance of commencing a debate before Easter.

The mess created in Bonn through the Laniel Government's handling of the amendments and protocols was only cleaned up by outside pressures; had this not been done, further conversations on the Saar would have been impossible. They had already been compromised through unreasonable stipulations insisted upon by Seydoux and other bitter opponents of EDC.

The Laniel Government did nothing, according to Robert Schuman (COLED 188), to accelerate consideration of the EDC Treaty in the Foreign Affairs Committee until Schuman and some friendly associates posed a great number of questions which the Government was required to answer.

If Laniel ever does act, it will be because Teitgen, Pinay, Reynaud, René Mayer, Mollet, Monnet, Bidault and a few others have forced him to do so.

I will conclude this over-long letter by repeating what I have already said in a telegram, namely, we must treat the French as coldbloodedly as they treat us if we are to succeed in what is avowedly a common policy in the interest of both our nations. For my own part, I intend to continue to love these agreeable, attractive, and infinitely resourceful people, but love must be separated from gullibility over their political protestations!

Very sincerely yours,

David Bruce

P.S. I would be indebted to you if you would pass this letter, with its attachments, on to Bob Bowie, who might be interested in it.

I enclose a turgid paper, which I wrote a couple of nights ago (but am not sending to the Dept.), which embodies some more views on the situation here.

DB:DES